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Abstract
Many low and middle-income countries have either implemented or 
considered conditional or unconditional cash transfers to poor 
households as a means of alleviating poverty. Evidence from pilot 
schemes in many developed and developing economies, including those 
in Africa, suggests that cash transfers do not only alleviate poverty; they 
also promote social cohesion and reduce the propensity for violent 
responses. For example, studies have shown a direct impact of cash 
transfers on Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). In some studies, the rate of 
IPV (including emotional violence) was significantly reduced when one 
of the partners was a beneficiary of cash transfer. However, there are 
limited studies on the potential of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) 
for stemming gang violence. Our study contributes to filling this gap. We 
examine here the possibilities of conditional cash transfers for stemming 
intractable gang-related violence in the Cape Flats. 
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The situation on the Cape Flats 
Studies (Hidrobo and Fernald 2013; Crost, Felter and Johnston 2014; Idris 
2017; Buller et al. 2018) suggest that the effects of social protection initiatives, 
such as (un)conditional cash transfers and vouchers, on social cohesion and 
poverty alleviation are generally positive. Although there are concerns (Idris 
2017:1) that the policy can unwittingly create divisions between beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries, the overarching summation is that it helps to foster 
social cohesion, reduce violence and stem poverty. Conditional Cash 
Transfers include all forms of cash and in-kind transfers, such as school 
feeding and public works programmes. It is often proposed for vulnerable 
households, refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), with the 
objectives of reducing their exposure to emotional shocks and their recourse 
to negative coping strategies, and of strengthening social cohesion (Cooper 
2018:23). 
South Africa currently operates a social grants programme as a means of 
cash transfer, albeit unconditional. It is part of an extensive benefits system 
which goes to children, people with disabilities and elderly people. The 
country has one of Africa’s largest social grant programmes. According to 
Webb and Vally (2020), eighteen million people in South Africa depend on 
social grants, with 20% of households depending on grants as their main 
source of income. It has to be added, however, that there are no unemployment 
grants for adults. 
While the public discourse on social grants is often critical and negative, 
research indicates that social grants have had a tremendous and noticeably 
positive socio-economic impact on poverty and inequality in South Africa. In 
a study conducted by Bhorat and Cassim (2014), they found that an estimated 
76 per cent of government spending on social grants is received by the poorest 
40 per cent of the population. They also found that the 2005–2010 expansion 
of the state’s social security system to include more grants for the elderly and 
child support, has increased the levels of expenditure of the poor and 
contributed to declining household inequality. Also, grants have been found to 
improve the quality and quantity of food in recipient households (Williams 
2004), reduce the likelihood of drugs and alcohol use in children who received 
grants early in life (Department of Social Development 2012), reduce 
adolescent pregnancy (Heinrich, Hoddinott and Samson 2012:620), as well as 
reduce sexual behaviour that put adolescent girls at extreme risk of contracting 
HIV (Cluver et al. 2013:362).  
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Despite the scheme’s relative ‘success’, questions have been raised on whether 
or not there should be some form of conditionality attached to the grants 
(Lund et al. 2008:2). According to the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2003), connecting conditions to 
social security interventions tends to positively support the individual in, for 
example, a return to work characterised by significant state financial 
commitment. Our study advocates a measure of conditionality attached to 
the proposed cash transfer. We examine the potential of Conditional Cash 
Transfers (CCTs) in stemming the intractable gang violence that has plagued 
South Africa’s Western Cape Province specifically, and the country in general. 
We argue for a negotiated conditional cash transfer (as will be discussed in 
detail in later sections) that will require some form of behavioural 
modification from beneficiaries. Our position for conditionality is similar to 
that held by Lund and others (2008:2), who argue that increased demands 
for HIV/AIDS and Foster Child grants in many countries have indicated 
that the idea of conditionality is gaining favour. 
The intractable violence 
Scholars are at variance on an acceptable definition of gangs. There is, 
however, a consensus amongst researchers on the criteria for whether a 
group is a gang or not. The two widely accepted rules are age – generally 
adolescents (14–24) – and the engagement in law-violating behaviour 
(Esbensen et al. 2001:106). Although Huff (1998) puts the typical age range 
of gang members at 14 to 24 years of age, researchers have generally agreed 
that the age range can be adapted ‘downward’ or ‘upward’. It depends on a 
variety of factors. Children as young as ten or adults as old as 30 do belong 
to gangs. There are also ongoing debates on institutional and political 
meanings of the word ‘gang’. Meehan (2000:338) argues that groups are 
partly fictions, and that terms like ‘gang’ and ‘gang-team’ (as used by the 
police) are often misused to the point that every activity in which young 
people engage can be called gang activity. 
In recent years, the protracted gang violence that has plagued the Cape Flats 
in the Western Cape Province has received extensive media coverage. It has 
also prompted a national discourse about the remote and immediate 
cause(s), as well as appropriate policy response(s) to stem or mitigate the 
menace. Petersen (2019) estimates that there are about 30 significant gangs 
in Cape Town alone. Among the biggest groupings are the Americans, the 
28s, the Mongrels, the Terrible Josters and the Junky Funky Kids. There are 
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also countless splinter groups with memberships of tens to thousands, each 
associated with one of the significant gangs. 
In July 2019, at the peak of the gang violence, the South African government 
deployed members of the South African Defence Force (SANDF) to quell 
what had become an extraordinary bloody spate of gang violence. Justifying 
the deployment of SANDF to the affected communities, Police Minister 
Bheki Cele, while addressing the South African Parliament, remarked thus:
In recent years, the tide of crime in the country has revealed a dreadful 
trend. We [are] confronted with the sad reality of multiple burial 
activities. The scenes of dead bodies in Philippi, [and] Mitchells Plain is 
unbearable. I challenge all generals in SAPS to surrender their uniforms 
if this situation does not improve. The battle requires a dedicated force 
that is equal to the task (Lindwa 2019). 
In the past, a military invasion, or even mere suggestions of military 
deployment, would have sparked public outrage and also prompted protests. 
Sightings of men in uniform around black and coloured communities often 
evoke deep emotions and resentments. At its peak, the apartheid government 
used the military and police to suppress agitations for equality and calls for 
an end to the segregation that apartheid represented. The context has been 
different this time. According to De Greef (2019), when the first batch of 
soldiers arrived in Mitchells Plain, people did not hide or erupt in protest as 
many would have done decades ago when the army was a symbol of 
subjugation and white minority rule. Instead, residents rushed from their 
homes to welcome the troops. 
In many ways, Mitchells Plain is a microcosm of the bigger problem of 
insecurity and violence across the Western Cape specifically, and South 
Africa in general. According to the Citizens’ Council for Public Safety and 
Criminal Justice (2019), the police recorded more than 2 800 murders in 
2018, with the country’s homicide rate of about 66 killings per 100 000 
people ranking among the highest in the world. 
Decades of government neglect and high unemployment have contributed 
to a proliferation in gang-related activities in some communities in the 
Western Cape. In 2013 the Police estimated that there are over 100 000 gang 
members in the city of over 4 million people. Gang-related conflicts led to 
900 murders in 2019, more than the annual total for 2018. The root cause of 
the bloodshed lies in the decades of apartheid’s social engineering, during 
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which the Cape Flats lacked funding, quality education and police resources 
(Bax, Sguazzin and Vecchiatto 2019).  
Socio-economic and socio-cultural underpinnings of gang 
violence
It would be rather one-dimensional to attribute gang violence only to 
economic deprivation. There are many underlying causal factors for social 
violence. The biosocial theory, for instance, attempts to identify the biological 
determinants of crime and violence. Wilson (1975) argued that people are 
biosocial organisms whose behaviours are influenced by both their physical 
characteristics and environmental conditions. Modern biosocial theorists 
believe that physical, ecological and social conditions interact in complex 
ways to produce human behaviour (see Englander 2007; Ellis 2005; Fischbein 
2001; Yaralian and Raine 2001). 
Taylor (2013:340) conducted a study which examined why American boys 
joined gangs and found nine primary reasons: the recruiter was friendly and 
encouraging toward them; the group offered safety and protection from 
other groups; the potential gang member viewed the recruiters and socialisers 
as very accepting of them; belonging to a gang was regarded as a quick path 
to gaining respect from other youth in the community; the member being 
recruited felt that membership in the gang would enhance his masculinity 
and reputation of being tough; the possibility of making money, owning a 
car and having positive attention from girls; the opportunity for delinquency 
and violence as a release of frustrations common to adolescence; the chance 
to have fun by committing delinquent acts with other delinquent peers; and 
the chance to participate in activities that allow for temporary escape by 
acting out frustrations that stem from the family. 
In the context of our study, however, we examine the impact of economic 
deprivation on gang-related violence in the Western Cape. One of the biggest 
challenges plaguing South Africa is the high rate of unemployment. 
According to Statistics South Africa (2019), unemployment is common 
amongst youths (aged 15–34). According to the report, almost 4 in every ten 
young people in the labour force did not have a job. Also, the unemployment 
rate within this group was 39.6% in the first quarter of 2019. 
According to Statistics South Africa (2019): 
The burden of unemployment is mostly amongst the youth. The youth 
account for 63.5% of the total number of unemployed persons. The 
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unemployment rate among the youth is higher irrespective of education 
level. The graduate unemployment rate was 33.5% for those aged 15–24 
and 10.2% among those aged 25–34 years, while the rate among adults 
(aged 35–64 years) was 4.7%. Just over 30% of the youth have jobs, and 
about half of them participate in the labour market. Within the youth, 
those aged 15–24 years are more vulnerable in the labour market with an 
unemployment rate of over 52%, an absorption rate of about 12.2% and 
a labour force participation rate of 25.6%. 
It is important to state that we are not assuming that providing skills to gang 
members (and to a large extent the wider public) will solve the unemployment 
problem in South Africa. There are many ‘skilled’ graduates and matriculants 
without work. The unemployment crisis is deeper than ‘skills acquisition’ 
alone can reasonably solve. However, in the context of our study, we advocate 
skills training and acquisition as alternative avenues where gang members 
(or intending gang members) can expend energy while learning valuable life 
skills that could potentially make them self-employed. 
Conflict theorists (Bonger 1969; Marx 1967 [1885]; Taylor et al. 1973) have 
explored the direct or indirect link between economic conditions and crime. 
Hagan (1994) argues that inequality among youth can reduce self-esteem 
and foster the development of a negative self-image, which in turn can lead 
to criminal behaviour. According to Braithwaite (1979), when young people 
get involved in illicit activities like gang violence, they are not only motivated 
by the short-term ‘gains’ they may derive but more by the feelings of social 
competence and increased self-esteem that come with belonging to a gang. 
In his 1979 thesis on powerlessness, Braithwaite (1979:68) asserts that:
Delinquent and criminal acts are an attempt to make a mark on the 
world, to be noticed, to get identity feedback … [F]or the powerless, 
crime and delinquency are a desperate effort to make things happen, to 
assert control.
Although economic deprivation (whether real or perceived) is a significant 
cause of violence, including gang-related violence, it is nonetheless 
imprudent to ascribe all forms of violent behaviour to one’s economic state. 
For example, Baird (2018:189) avers that whilst socio-economic exclusion 
impacts on the prevalence of gang-related activities in a particular area, the 
majority of young men who join gangs do it to emulate and reproduce 
‘successful’ local male identities. Baird describes the aspiration to ‘manhood’ 
as the desire by young men to accumulate what he termed ‘masculine capital’ 
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– the material and symbolic signifiers of manhood, which lead many young 
men to perceive gangs to be the spaces of male success. In South Africa, the 
quest for masculine capital runs significantly deep. According to Harris and 
Vermaak (2015:46), one of the consequences of apartheid’s policy of 
segregation was the break-up of families. Fathers had to travel long distances 
for work, and could sometimes only return home after weeks or months 
away. Consequently, high proportions of children grew up without a male 
role model. Gang leaders unwittingly filled the vacuum of missing fathers or 
father figures. 
Studies have also linked gang involvement to race and ethnicity (Esbensen 
and Tusinski 2007; Vigil 2002). According to Feng (2019), past research on 
the links between race or ethnicity and gang involvement in the context of 
America has focused on racially homogenous gangs – African American and 
Hispanic groups – thereby perpetuating the perception of gangs as only 
dominant within certain racial/ethnic groups. Recent studies have however 
shown that gangs are multiracial. Studies have also shown that social 
disorganisation, discrimination, immigration and cumulative disadvantage 
impact on the propensity to join gangs. The disorganisation and 
discrimination fostered by apartheid in South Africa could explain why 
gangs in South Africa often thrive in particular racial or ethnic communities.
The impact of drug use and trade 
One of the major catalysts for the intractable Cape Flats gangs’ violence is 
the proliferation of drugs. Street gangs are the primary distributors of illegal 
drugs on the streets of Cape Town. Most gangs make millions from selling 
illegal drugs, and use the proceeds to pay stipends to gang members, thereby 
keeping them loyal. Gangs also use the proceeds from the drug trade to 
operate cash-based businesses such as barbershops, music stores, restaurants, 
catering services, tattoo parlours – usually as a means to commingle drug 
proceeds with funds generated through legitimate commerce. Prinsloo and 
Bax (2020) aver that the heroin trade alone is estimated to be worth $260 
million a year. 
According to Prinsloo and Bax (2020), at the peak of the novel coronavirus 
pandemic, a network of gang leaders in the country known as the Council 
made funds available to gang members and their families to mitigate the 
harsh effects of the lockdown. The network even sensitised the public on 
ways to prevent the spread of the virus, further confirming the immense 
influence gangs (leaders and followers) wield in their communities. 
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Existing Studies
Limited studies, but available reports and theories
Although studies that examine the potential of CCTs to stem gang-related 
violence are limited, findings from related studies suggest CCTs can play 
significant roles in reducing the propensity to violent behaviour by 
beneficiaries. For example, Buller and others (2018) undertook a mixed-
method study that reviewed the impact of cash transfers on Intimate Partner 
Violence (IPV) in low and middle-income countries and concluded that 
CCTs have the potential to decrease IPV at the margins across large 
populations of vulnerable groups. Significantly, they found that CCTs 
appear to reduce physical and sexual IPV more consistently than emotional 
abuse or controlling behaviours. Buller and others (2018:11) concluded that 
CCT does impact positively on IPV, at least in their study’s milieu, but 
admitted that CCTs might have different impacts on different types of 
violence. 
Comparable studies exploring the effects of CCTs on domestic 
violence
Hidrobo and Fernald (2013) conducted a study which examined the 
impact cash transfers had on domestic violence. Their research focused 
on the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) scheme in Ecuador. The 
programme designed as a CCT consisted of giving mothers a monthly 
stipend if their children met specific schooling and health requirements. 
The project, however, became equivalent to an unconditional cash 
transfer due to administrative constraints. The cash transfer (which was 
$15 a month in 2005) did not depend on the number of children in the 
household. Hidrobo and Fernald found that mothers’ (recipients’) levels 
of education played a significant role in how cash transfers impacted 
their relationships. They found that for mothers with more than six 
years of schooling, the BDH significantly decreased the probability that 
a husband or partner would engage in emotional violence by 8 per cent, 
and would increase his control of behaviour by 14 per cent. Where 
mothers had six years or less of schooling, however, the BDH effect on 
domestic violence was ‘ambiguous’. For households where the mothers’ 
years of education were equal to or more than their partners’, the BDH 
significantly increased emotional violence by 9 per cent (Hidrobo and 
Fernald 2013:317). 
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Other studies also show significant impacts of cash transfers on violent 
behaviour. Bobonis and Castro (2010) examined the effect of Oportunidades, 
Mexico’s CCT programme on domestic violence. They found both short-
term and long-term effects. In the short run (2–6 years), there was a 
decrease in physical abuse by 3.6 per cent. However, between 5–9 years 
after the programme’s implementation, they found that the effects 
disappeared. Peru’s CCT programme named Juntas had a similar impact 
as Oportunidades in Mexico. According to Perova (2010), the programme 
significantly decreased physical violence by 9 per cent and emotional abuse 
by 11 per cent.
A comparable study exploring the effects of CCTs on militia 
violence
The Niger Delta Amnesty programme in Nigeria is arguably one of the 
largest (in terms of the number of beneficiaries) CCTs implemented in 
Africa. According to Timsar (2018), approximately 30 000 people in the 
Niger Delta enrolled in the amnesty programme.  The amnesty’s goal was to 
stem growing agitations and violence from indigenes of the region (mostly 
youths). They decried the negative impact the activities of Multi-National 
Oil Corporations (MNOCs) had on environmental and socio-economic life 
in the area. Decades after oil exploration began in the Niger Delta, the region 
was bedevilled by environmental degradation/contamination, chronic 
poverty, unemployment, rural-urban migration, and human rights abuses 
(Adebayo and Matsilele 2019). 
A military approach to quelling agitation by the Nigerian government did 
not provide lasting peace in the region. Instead, it led to increased 
dissatisfaction from the populace, which led to more violence. Acknowledging 
the ineffectuality of an aggressive approach to providing lasting and 
sustainable peace in the Niger Delta region, the Nigerian government 
initiated a CCT programme. The programme required agitators to renounce 
militancy, surrender their weapons, and submit to an exhaustive process of 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). Opinions differ on 
the success or otherwise of the amnesty programme. For example, Adeyemo 
and Olu-Adeyemi (2010:7) questioned the rationale behind the Amnesty 
offer to militants by the Federal Government, when there was never a plan 
laid out to resolve the lingering problems of endemic poverty and 
environmental degradation in the region. 
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Examining the potential of CCTs and DDR to reduce the Cape 
Flats gang violence
We do not intend to delve into the intractable polemics for or against the 
amnesty initiative. The amnesty as a form of CCT was of interest to us 
because of its slight similarity with our research focus on gang-related 
violence in the Western Cape. Firstly, it could be seen as a means of 
assuaging and stemming visible outbreaks of violence. Secondly, conditions 
similar to those that obtain in our study area have led to militancy in the 
Niger Delta – mostly involving a youthful segment of the population who 
partly hinged their agitations on poverty and [perceived] feelings of 
relative deprivation and inequality.  
It is pertinent to state that we do not intend to slant the study towards 
causal reductionism. The social malaise of gang violence results from 
many reasons often contriving together, and not from single causes. We are 
also mindful of the fact that cash transfer, whether conditional or 
unconditional, is primarily a policy tool to respond to poverty, inequality 
and vulnerability. We are also aware of the unlikelihood of large-scale 
institutional programming with the specific objective of decreasing gang 
violence. However, as averred by Hidrobo and Fernald (2013:317), if small 
design changes have the potential to stem or reduce violence in any form, 
transfer programmes could have the scope to realise significant gains 
across sectors. Moreover, transfer programmes can be implemented at a 
lower cost than force specific programming, such as the recent military 
deployment to the Cape Flats.  
Our study examines the general supposition that every progress towards 
violence reduction is significant, no matter how ‘little.’ If CCT can stem 
gang violence in our study area, then we argue that it would provide the 
necessary environment to tackle the critical structural and historical 
problems that often increase gang membership and fuel violent gang 
behaviour. 
A proposal for gathering relevant data and implementing 
conditional cash transfers 
Given the central aim of the study, to examine the potential of conditional 
cash transfer in stemming the Cape Flats gang violence, we put forward an 
action research intervention approach to policy implementation. Suffice 
to add that the action research intervention is simply a proposal for what 
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we believe is the most appropriate methodology to adopt. Implementers 
can adjust the methodology to suit specific contexts. Action research is an 
integration of research and action in a series of elastic cycles which have to 
do with the collection of data, the analysing of the data, the planning and 
introduction of actionable strategies to initiate positive change(s), and the 
evaluation of those changes through the collection of more data, analysis 
and interpretation (Somekh 2006:7). 
Stages in the proposed intervention
Action research cycles typically develop through the following phases: 
identifying a problem that needs intervention, collecting, organising, 
analysing, and interpreting data; and taking action based on this 
information (Sax and Fisher 2001:72). Figure 1 below shows the stages 
involved in action research adopted by us.
Figure 1: The action research process 
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Problem Identification 
The success of any successful intervention is dependent on accurate 
identification of the main problem which requires intervention. Given 
the main aim of intervention to effect change in a given situation, it 
becomes essential to first identify the condition(s) that require(s) 
change. In the case of this study, we note the rise in gang-related violence 
in some communities in the Western Cape, prompting the deployment 
of members of the South African National Defence Force. Given that the 
process also involves seeking to understand the nature of the situation 
and ascertaining the underlying causal factors, we recommend 
preliminary interviews with purposively selected stakeholders in the 
communities. The proposed stakeholders include religious leaders, 
community heads, educators, leaders of youth organisations, and 
gangsters. The discussions will stir-up or generate specific questions 
that will form the fulcrum of the intervention. Given the immense 
influence gangsters have on local communities, it is pertinent to include 
gangsters as key stakeholders in the entire process of developing and 
implementing a programme. 
Data Gathering 
We propose an intervention process that emanates from the communities, 
thereby providing a sense of community ownership of the process. 
Often, governments and private individuals or organisations have good 
intentions when they plan and implement interventions. Still, as noted 
by Hughes (2018:62), good intentions and the smartest of expert 
interventions alone are not enough to transform lives. Following 
suggestions by Fraenkel and Wallen (2003:41), we recommend two main 
phases of data collection before the project’s implementation. Although 
Fraenkel and Wallen’s suggestions were in the context of action research 
within an educational setting, we believe it has profound applicability 
to this study. 
First, Fraenkel and Wallen (2003:41) suggest a process of observation of 
participants involved in the study. In the case of an educational setting, 
they state that these participants might include students, other teachers, 
parents, and administrators. To describe what is seen and heard, they 
suggest that researchers use field notes or journals to record their 
observations. For our intervention, we recommend a period of 
participant observation involving a team made up of purposively 
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selected stakeholders in the community, members of the Department of 
Social Development (DSD), and members of the allied security forces 
(preferably the police). We recommend observation for some time as 
agreed upon by all members, but typically not less than three months. 
The period of observation will allow the team to observe the remote and 
immediate triggers of gang violence. It will also provide researchers 
with information regarding, for instance, the leaders of the gangs, the 
recruitment process, the incentives provided by recruiters, the activities 
that gang members get involved in when they are not within the groups, 
the family dynamics, and the economic ecosystems. 
The period of observation will also provide team members with the 
opportunity to negotiate cash transfer conditionality with community 
members. Davis and others (2012) argue that cash transfers, especially 
in Africa, are not, and should not be, unilaterally determined by 
politicians. They argue for a process of ‘soft conditionality’ which allows 
beneficiaries and their wider community to be informed about the 
objectives of the programme. The idea is that when people know why 
the programme’s implementation is necessary and why they are 
receiving cash, there is a greater likelihood that the programme will 
achieve its set goals. 
Fraenkel and Wallen (2003:42) also suggest the use of interviews to 
collect relevant data before interventions. Typically, interviews are 
mostly interpersonal and involve an oral exchange of questions and 
answers between two or more people. As stated earlier, interviews 
should be conducted with key stakeholders during the period of 
observation – to gauge their feelings of the proposed intervention and 
welcome suggestions that are specific to their community’s needs. 
Thirdly, Fraenkel and Wallen (2003:43) recommend the analysis of 
existing records as another way of gathering data for action research. 
They believe it is convenient, and often the least time-consuming since 
such data have already been collected. The responsibility of team 
members is to make as much sense as possible of what is already there. 
A few examples of this type of data are school attendance records, 
minutes of meetings, newspaper features and editorials, policy manuals, 
and police records. 
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Data interpretation 
Once the data is obtained during the period of participant observation, 
team members must take time out to analyse the data and arrive at 
reasonable conclusions that will guide the direction of the intervention. 
During the process of data analysis, the team should identify the 
significant themes that emerge from the data and the reasons why they 
played out in particular ways. Analysing data helps the team to acquire 
an improved understanding of the occurrence under investigation – in 
this case, the remote and immediate causes of gang violence in the given 
communities – and as a result, helps to formulate an appropriate cash 
transfer policy that is community-specific. 
Policy implications and recommendations
As stated earlier in this paper, we do not intend to put forward a causal 
reductionism theory that presupposes that social (or individual) 
maladies are the result of a single cause. We recognise that gang violence 
in the Western Cape is a result of a multiplicity of factors. It includes the 
colonial legacy of segregation that gave rise (whether wittingly or 
unwittingly) to many dysfunctional and disorganised families and social 
networks, all found to have fostered youth restiveness and gang violence 
(Altshuler 1970). Although we put forward a conditional cash transfer 
approach to stemming gang violence in the Western Cape, we recognise 
that the problem runs deeper than what a few hundreds or thousands of 
Rands can resolve. 
Programme implementation
We argue that in conditions of pervasive open conflicts, such as gang-
related conflicts, negative peace (referring to the absence of direct 
violence) could be an excellent first start and an essential foundation for 
building lasting and sustainable positive peace. In this section, we put 
forward the following action steps towards implementing a CCT that 
could be unique to the Western Cape’s socio-political milieu, and could 
provide community members with a sense of ‘ownership’ of the process. 
Proposed communities
We propose a municipal-level implementation of CCT that would target 
youths in selected communities within the Western Cape. For the 
proposed intervention, we recommend a CCT programme that will focus 
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on three selected communities within the Cape Flats. As the most affected 
areas in the recent upsurge in the number of deaths resulting from gang-
related violence, we propose the communities of Manenberg, Hanover 
Park and Mitchells Plain. In Manenberg, for instance, teachers at 14 
schools banded together in 2013, declaring the situation too dangerous 
for students and teachers to come to school any more, and demanded 
that the Department of Education take severe and meaningful action to 
ensure the safety of learners and educators. They formed the Teachers 
Steering Committee and their refusal to teach forced the Department to 
close all 14 schools (Hanson 2013). A similar situation played out in 
Hanover Park and Mitchells Plain. These three communities have indeed 
gone through traumatic levels of gang-related violence in the last few 
years.
We also wish to emphasise, however, that the actual choice of communities 
should be linked to the programme objectives and design, availability of 
data, budgets, resources and capacity of the implementing organisation 
and its governmental and non-governmental partners. Identified and 
selected stakeholders, government structures, external organisations or a 
combination of all of them should be involved in establishing the criteria, 
selection and identification of potential recipient communities. 
Eligibility in terms of age 
We are mindful of the fluidity of the term ‘youth’, and the variability of 
the ages at which people join gangs. Olaiya (2014) makes a distinction 
between ‘modern-civic’ and ‘traditional-primordial’ notions of youth 
and avers that it often gives rise to the social and cultural tensions that 
characterise many African nations. According to Olaiya (2014:11), 
Africa’s adverse economic conditions mean that a sizeable proportion of 
its youth population is unable to meet socially ascribed responsibilities 
even when they have become adults, as identified by their chronological 
age (e.g. 40 years and above). Thus, the youth phase on the continent has 
become extended due to the harsh and lingering socio-economic 
conditions in many countries.
For this study, we recommend young men and women between the ages 
of 10-30 as eligible for the proposed CCT. It should be emphasised, 
however, that joining the scheme should be voluntary. 
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Negotiating conditions
We recommend the following conditions for the proposed CCT in the 
selected communities. 
Recipients must commit to a 90-95% school attendance rate. This can be 
verified by including teachers and educators as part of the implementation 
team. 
Recipients who are out of school must commit to at least 10 hours of 
attendance to designated skills acquisition centres. Recipients in school 
can or should also be part of the skills acquisition programme. These 
centres should provide training for skills such as tailoring, plumbing, 
catering and hairdressing. The goal is to give the recipients the needed 
skills to either get jobs or start small businesses. The end goal is to reduce 
poverty and the predisposition to join gangs or be involved in gang-
related vices.
Recipients must commit to a period of mentorship in business and life 
skills. Mentors should be embedded within the skills acquisition scheme. 
Owners of guns and other dangerous weapons, especially gang members, 
must commit to submitting their firearms and other weapons in a ‘mini’ 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of gang 
members. An exhaustive DDR process that involves taking gang members 
out of their groups and helping them to reintegrate as ‘normal’ members 
of their communities is not the focus of our study. Still, we hope that our 
proposed intervention would inspire future research or intervention in 
that direction. One of the conditions for recipients of cash transfer in the 
Niger Delta Amnesty programme was for them to submit weapons. 
Regarding all the conditions decided upon, it is important to add that 
recipient communities should understand how the conditions were 
arrived at. 
Payment and evaluation  
We recommend a payment system that is negotiated for, and collectively 
arrived at by all stakeholders involved. Most CCT programmes transfer 
the money to the mother of the household, or the student in some 
circumstances. We recommend direct payment to beneficiaries who 
meet the agreed conditions. As stated earlier, the requirements to be 
attached to the proposed cash transfer must result from a series of 
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negotiations between identified and selected stakeholders, and the 
government. 
A specific payment modality that may be recommended, is that of the 
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme (Acosta et al. 2019), an 
extensive social protection and human development programme in the 
Philippines that is reputed to be well-managed and efficiently run. Under 
the plan, beneficiary households receive health and education grants, 
subject to compliance with respective programme conditions (Acosta et 
al. 2019). Payment is made directly to beneficiaries through bank cards 
or cash collections at strategic locations. 
In the first few years of the Pilipino programme, challenges were 
understandably related to the necessary implementation process, and 
pay-out to beneficiaries used to be delayed and irregular. Many recipients 
experienced difficulties with receiving transfers due to common 
problems, such as delays in issuing cash cards, irregularities and 
suspension of pay-outs and travelling costs and transaction fees at ATMs 
or pay-out locations. These problems may likely arise with our proposed 
intervention, so we recommend that all stakeholders take into cognisance 
and tackle them before they occur. 
We recommend that payment modalities be reached collectively between 
key stakeholders, relevant financial institutions and government, in a 
way that would provide a system that is unique to South Africa, with 
limited technical problems. 
Exploring alternatives
As mentioned earlier, we are putting forward a proposal that can be amended 
or adjusted to reflect economic and socio-cultural realities on the ground. 
There are alternatives, however, that may be more cost-effective. An example 
is a remarkable approach adopted by Cure Violence – a globally-recognised 
programme that takes a public health approach to reduce violence. 
Founded in 1995 by Gary Slutkin, a former head of the World Health 
Organisation’s Intervention Development Unit, the organisation adopts 
a unique model of disease-control and behaviour-change methods to 
reduce the spread of violence in communities around the world. By 
detecting and interrupting conflicts, identifying and treating the highest 
risk individuals and changing social norms, the approach has proven 
very effective for reducing street and youth violence. It has also been 
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applied to tackle issues such as cartel wars, tribal conflicts, school 
violence and ideologically inspired violence. Cure Violence is using the 
methods and strategies associated with disease control:
Detecting and interrupting conflicts
Identifying and treating the highest risk individuals
Changing social norms
We do not intend to go into details of Cure Violence’s methods and 
implementation. Our goal is to highlight the fact that if we are intentional 
in our quest for peaceful communities, we will always find ready 
alternatives. 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have focused on gang violence in the Cape Flats and 
proposed a CCT project in a few specific communities. These 
communities are not representative of other gang-pervaded communities 
in South Africa, but what we envisage, is that an evaluation of the success 
or otherwise of an intervention in the Cape Flats communities could act 
as a template for possible interventions across other communities in the 
country.
We have attempted to provide empirical evidence to show that social 
protection initiatives are critical to the overarching goal of moving as 
many people as possible away from poverty. Evidence also suggests they 
can reduce forms of violence, including domestic and Intimate Partner 
Violence. Although our study does not provide case study evidence of 
CCTs’ role in reducing gang violence, we nonetheless base our 
recommendations on the successes of similar schemes for reducing 
violence in situations where feelings of relative deprivation are severe. 
The authors also show that similar studies which suggest that CCTs 
should be combined with other programmes to improve the quality of 
the supply of health and education services, and should provide 
additional supporting services. That explains why we recommend the 
creation of more skills acquisition centres and mentorship programmes 
in the selected communities, so that we can achieve a broader programme 
through conditions that focus on outcomes rather than on the collection 
of money, or the use of services alone.
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Hughes (2018:133) affirms that the further individuals get from 
subsistence, the easier is it to ask questions like: what do I want, and how 
do I get it? Hughes argues that a guaranteed income, whether conditional 
or not, would acknowledge and empower the agency that exists inside 
every human being – the ability to create his or her future. Ultimately, 
our goal in this study is to encourage discourse on the composite 
restoration of human dignity as put forward by Martin Luther King, who 
remarked that:
The dignity of the individual will flourish when the decisions concerning 
his life are in his own hands; when he has the assurance that his income 
is stable and certain, and when he knows he has the means to seek self-
improvement (Cited in Milner 2019).
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